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COMES NOW Appellant/Cross-Respondent TracFone Wireless, Inc. ("TracFone"), and 
hereby submits this Sur-Reply in response to the Joint Reply Brief filed on February 6, 2015 by 
Cross-Appellants Ada County and the Idaho Association of Counties (collectively, "Cross-
Appellants"). 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In their Joint Reply Brief, Cross-Appellants present an inaccurate and distorted 
description of the history and meaning of specialized mobile radio ("SMR") service, in a failed 
attempt to categorize TracFone as a "wireless carrier" under Idaho Code § 31-4802(15) and 
therefore subject to the 911 fee requirement under the Idaho Emergency Communications Act. 
Idaho Code § 31-4802(15) defines "wireless carrier" to include "certain specialized mobile 
radio providers designated as covered carriers by the federal communications commission in 4 7 
CFR 20.18 and any successor to such rule." (Emphasis added.) Cross-Appellants erroneously 
assert that all providers of commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS"), including TracFone, are 
SMR providers, because "CMRS ... clearly grew out of the previously existing SMRS." (Joint 
Reply, p. I 0.) However, neither the history of SMR, as set forth in FCC and court decisions, nor 
the meaning of SMR, support Cross-Appellants' flawed position and erroneous historical 
argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Relevant FCC History Directly Contradicts The Assertion That Commercial Mobile 
Radio Service Is A Subset Of Specialized Mobile Radio Service. 
Cross-Appellants spend a significant portion of their Joint Reply brief purportedly 
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reviewing the history of SMR service, for the apparent purpose of convincing this Court that, 
because the FCC commenced using the term "CMRS" at a time when SMR service already 
existed, CMRS is simply a type of SMR service. (Joint Reply, pp. 3-10.) Cross-Appellants 
further claim that TracFone, by virtue of being a CMRS provider, is somehow also a SMR 
provider, and as such, a wireless carrier under Idaho Code § 31-4802(15). Contrary to Cross-
Appellants' arguments, the history of SMR clearly indicates that some SMR services are CMRS, 
but not that CMRS is a subset of SMR service. 
A. The Origins Of SMR Service. 
In 1974, the FCC created a "new category of private mobile operators" called Specialized 
Mobile Radio (SMR) service providers and allocated specific radio frequencies to the SMR 
service. National Ass 'n of Regulatory Utility Comm 'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) ("NARUC I"). "This new category of operators, known as Specialized Mobile Radio 
Systems (SMRS), would operate on a commercial basis to provide service to third parties."1 Id.; 
see also In the Matter of Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Expand Eligibility 
and Shared Use Criteria in the Private Land A1obile Services, PR Docket No. 89-45, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 89-70 (rel. Mar. 28, 1989), ,I 7 ("It was anticipated that the ability of 
the SMR licensee to make a profit would serve as an incentive to invest in spectrally efficient 
trunked equipment and to introduce this service to a broader range of potential users."). Prior to 
1 At that time, the FCC also allocated 40 MHz on the 900 MHz band to develop a "nationwide, 
broad-band 'cellular' mobile radio communications system" and allocated 30 MHz on the 800 
MHz band for private services to be licensed for public safety, industrial, and land transportation 
purposes. See 525 F.2d at 634-35. 
TRACFONE'S SUR-REPLY IN RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPELLANTS' JOINT REPLY BRIEF- 4 
the FCC's establishment of SMR and the allocation of radio spectrum to that service, private 
communications systems primarily involved dispatch systems, such as those operated by police 
department and taxicab companies, and systems operated for the benefit of affiliated users. See 
NARUC I at 639. The FCC contemplated that SMR would be a new category of private mobile 
services operated for profit by entrepreneurs solely for the use of third party clients.2 Id. 
In time, SMR became more sophisticated, such that SMR operators were able to use new 
technologies to "package[ e] large numbers of stations for the purpose of creating systems that 
could serve vast geographic areas." (Joint Reply, p. 7 ( citing Chadmoore Communications, Inc. 
v. Federal Communications Commission, 113 F.3d 235,237 (D.C. Cir. 1997).) 
B. The Classification Of Certain Mobile Radio Services As CMRS. 
Cross-Appellants primary error lies in their revision of regulatory history regarding the 
classification of CMRS. It is not correct that "CMRS grew out of SMRS and in essence, became 
a for-profit SMRS," or that CMRS became a "subset of SMRS." (Joint Reply, pp. 8, 10 (alleging 
that CMRS "clearly grew out of the previously existing SMRS").) Indeed, as noted by the court 
in NARUC I, operators of SMR systems would operate on a commercial basis to provide service 
to third parties. 525 F .2d at 634. Though the FCC classified several existing and future mobile 
radio services as CMRS in 1993, long after the 197 4 creation of SMR services, there is no legal 
2 The NARUC I court describes the difference between common carriage and private carriage 
based on the "holding out" standard - a common carrier holds itself out to serve all 
indiscriminately, whereas a private carrier makes individualized decisions whether and on what 
terms to deal. See 525 F.2d at 640-642. Both common carriers and private carriers provide 
services to third parties for compensation. As described herein, some SMRS is provided on a 
common carrier basis; other SMRS is provided on a private carrier basis. 
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support for the proposition that any particular provider "would be considered a SMRS by virtue 
of being a CMRS." (Joint Reply, p. 10.) Providers are SMRS providers only if they utilize 
frequencies allocated by the FCC to SMRS.3 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 90.7 (defining "Specialized 
Mobile Radio System" as "A radio system in which licensees provide land mobile 
communications services ( other than radiolocation services) in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands 
on a commercial basis to entities eligible to be licensed under this Part, Federal Government 
entities, and individuals."). 
The FCC classification of mobile radio services occurred pursuant to the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("Budget Act"). 4 See In re. Implementation of Sections 3 (n) 
and 332 of the Communications Act et al., 9 FCC Red 1411 (1994) ("Section 332 
Implementation Order"). The Budget Act amended the Communications Act by adding Section 
332 and including a statutory definition of CMRS. Id. Section 332(d)(l) defines CMRS as "any 
mobile service (as defined in [47 U.S.C.A. § 153]) that is provided for profit and makes 
interconnected service available (A) to the public or (B) to such classes of eligible users as to be 
effectively available to a substantial portion of the public, as specified by regulation by the 
Commission." 47 U.S.C.A. § 332 (West).5 
3 The SMRS frequencies are in the 806-921 MHz band. See Land 1\llobile Service, 51 FCC2d 945 
(1975), ajf'd. sub nom NARUC I 
4 P .L. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). 
5 In implementing Section 332, the FCC defined CMRS according to three-prongs: (1) the 
service must be provided for profit; (2) the service must be interconnected with the public 
switched network; and (3) the service must be available to the public or to such classes of 
eligible users as to be effectively available to a substantial portion of the public. Section 332 
Implementation Order, 9 FCC Red at ,r,r 39, 50, 61. 
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The FCC then evaluated existing mobile radio services to determine which services 
should be classified under the new regulations as a CMRS based on the legislative definition. See 
9 FCC Red at 1448, 1 81. Certain SMR services were classified by the FCC as CMRS based 
upon that definition, while other SMR services did not fall within the legislative definition and 
were not classified as CMRS: 
[M]ost SMR licensees automatically meet two of the elements of the CMRS 
definition .... With respect to the "interconnection" element of the definition, 
however, our rules allow but do not require SMRs to provide interconnected 
service to subscribers. \Ve therefore conclude that classification of all SMR 
systems turns on whether they do, in fact, provide interconnected service as 
defined by the statute. Licensees who provide interconnected service will be 
classified as CMRS providers, while those who do not will be classified as PMRS 
[Private Mobile Radio Service] providers. 
9 FCC Red at 1450, 1 90. Therefore, it is correct to conclude that the FCC determined some 
SMR services to be CMRS, but that other SMR services are not CMRS. It is not correct to 
conclude, as the Cross-Appellants have, that a service would "be considered an SMRS by virtue 
of being a CMRS." Id. 
Wide-area interconnected SMR service, like the cellular and personal communications 
services with which it competes, is treated as a CMRS.6 Id. at 1451, 191. This treatment would 
6 Though some SMRS competes with cellular telephone service, they are still two separate types 
of mobile service. Cross-Appellants' characterization of Nextel as a "cellular telephone 
provider" is not accurate. (Joint Reply, p. 10.) Nextel (whose former name was Fleet Call) held 
SMRS licenses and was regulated as a SMRS licensee; it did not hold cellular radio licenses and 
was not regulated as a cellular telephone service. 9 FCC Red at 1415, 1 7 ("In 1991 ... we 
authorized Fleet Call, Inc. (now Nextel Corp.) to develop an SMR system that Fleet Call claimed 
would offer wide-area, digital voice and data service comparable or superior to cellular in 
quality."). While SMR systems can be similar to cellular systems, they "operate in a different 
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be alongside the FCC' s classification of non-SMR mobile radio services that met the definitional 
criteria of CMRS. Id. at 1448-59, ,r,r 81-115. The FCC determined that certain SMR systems 
would be classified as CMRS ("wide-area SMR that intends to offer for-profit interconnected 
service") while other SMR systems ("traditional SMR dispatch services") would be classified as 
private mobile radio systems. See id. at 1450-51, ,r,r 90-92; see also id. at 1510, ,r 269 ("We also 
have decided to classify SMR licensees as CMRS if they offer interconnected service to 
customers."). In short, some SMR services are CMRS; other SMR services are not. These FCC 
determinations indicate that, contrary to Cross-Appellants' position, CMRS did not "grow out of 
SMRS" nor did SMRS and CMRS merge. Rather, one specific type of SMRS (i.e. that provided 
by SMRS licensees over frequencies allocated to SMRS) was categorized as a type of CMRS 
(because it met the statutory definition for CMRS), just as cellular and personal communications 
services - services which are not provided using SMRS frequencies - are also CMRS. 
Indeed, the very case that Cross-Appellants rely on to support their erroneous view of 
CMRS being a subset of SMRS actually leads to the correct conclusion as set forth above: wide-
area interconnected SMR is only one of several kinds of mobile services that are categorized as 
CMRS. In their Joint Reply, Cross-Appellants include the following quote from Chadmoore: 
In August 1993, Congress amended the Communications Act to create two 
categories of mobile service - commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS") and 
private mobile radio service; and it directed the Commission to implement these 
categories in its regulations and provide for comparable regulation of substantially 
similar CMRS systems. See 47 U.S.C. § 332. The FCC subsequently classified 
any wide-area SMR system offering interconnected service for profit, such as the 
spectrum band and use somewhat different technology." (Joint Reply, p. 9 (quoting Mobile Relay 
Assocs. v. Federal Communications Commission, 457 F.3d 1, 4 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).) 
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one Chadmoore proposed, as a CMRS. Second Report and Order, GN Docket No. 
93-252, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, 1450-51 ~if 88-93 (1994). 
(Joint Reply, pp. 7-8 (quoting Chadmoore, 113 F.3d at 237).) Cross-Appellants rely on this 
quotation from Chadmoore, which states only that the FCC classified wide-area interconnected 
SMRS as CMRS, for the following conclusions, which do not logically flow from and are 
directly contradicted by the quoted language: 
In 1997, the FCC created two categories of mobile service - private mobile radio 
service and, importantly, the new category of Commercial Mobile Radio Services 
("CMRS"). The FCC moved SMRS into the newly created CMRS, meaning 
that CMRS was now a subset of SMRS. CMRS grew out of SMRS and, in 
essence, became a for-profit SMRS. Moreover, it was the FCC's intention that 
SMRS and CMRS merged and were subject to the same regulations. 
(Joint Reply, p. 8 (bold emphasis added).) This contention is plainly false. The FCC has never 
described CMRS - a statutory term which includes any mobile service provided for profit and 
makes interconnected service available as a "subset" of SMRS - a series of services, some of 
which are CMRS, others of which are not, but which are only provided over SMR allocated 
frequencies. Neither did the FCC ever "move" SMRS into CMRS or declare CMRS to be a 
subset of SMRS. As described above, CMRS is a statutory classification for all interconnected 
mobile services provided for profit (without regard to frequencies used), whereas SMRS was a 
service created by the FCC in 197 4 to be provided in a specific block of allocated frequencies. 
The Cross-Appellants' conclusions are unsupported and inaccurate. This is so for several 
reasons. First, CMRS was not created by the FCC in 1997 as asserted by the Cross-Appellants. 
CMRS is, as noted, a statutory term and was added to the Communications Act by Congress in 
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1993 as part of the Budget Act. The Budget Act added Section 332(d) to the Communications 
Act, which codified the aforementioned definition of CMRS. 
Second, as mentioned above, Cross-Appellants' conclusion that "CMRS was a subset of 
SMRS" is refuted by Chadmoore, itself. 113 F.3d at 237. Indeed, there is no authority to support 
that assertion. Federal precedent confirms that "CMRS encompasses different types of spectrum 
put to a variety of uses" and "CMRS is composed of cellular, PCS [Personal Communications 
Service], and SMR spectrum." BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 162 
F.3d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). There is no doubt that some SMRS 
(specifically, wide area interconnected SMRS provided to third parties for profit) is a subset of 
CMRS. However, SMRS is not an overarching category of service that subsumes all of CMRS. 
The Cross-Appellants' argument is, therefore, entirely backwards. 
Third, Section 20.9 of the FCC's regulations (47 C.F.R. § 20.9) lists "SMR services that 
provide interconnected service" as one of fourteen different types of mobile service categorized 
as CMRS. While TracFone operates its business by reselling two of those fourteen types of 
mobile service listed in Section 20.9 (i.e., Cellular Radiotelephone Service (Section 20.9(a)(7)) 
and Personal Communications Services (Section 20.9(a)(l 1))), that does not make it a SMR 
provider under Section 20.9(a)(4). TracFone does not use any SMR service to provide service to 
its customers. In conclusion, there is no factual or legal basis for Cross-Appellants' claim that 
"TracFone would be considered a SMRS by virtue of being a CMRS." (Joint Reply, p. 10.)7 
7 Cross-Appellants' misunderstanding of the various types of SMR services is apparent in its 
criticism of TracFone located in footnote 5 of the Joint Reply. (Joint Reply, p. 3 n. 5). TracFone 
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II. Cross-Appellants' Argument That TracFone Is A "Certain Specialized Mobile 
Radio Provider" As That Term Appears in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15) Is Belied By 
FCC Precedent. 
Cross-Appellants raise overly-simplistic, contradictory, and factually erroneous 
arguments in an effort to convince this Court that the term "certain other specialized mobile 
radio providers," as used in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15), ought to be interpreted in a generic sense 
to apply to "all types of mobile radio providers which are specifically identified by the FCC in 
47 C.F.R. § 20.18 that connect the public to 911 services," notwithstanding the specificity with 
which SMRS is defined and notwithstanding the undeniable fact that SMRS is provided only on 
frequencies allocated to this service. (Joint Reply, pp. 10, 12.) 
Cross-Appellants state that the terms "mobile radio systems" and "specialized" are both 
generic terms. In support of this claim, Cross-Appellants assert that it is "common knowledge 
that 'mobile radio providers' broadly refers to providers of communications systems which are 
based on radio frequencies." (Joint Reply, p. 11.) This unsupported assertion regarding "common 
knowledge" is incorrect. There are many telecommunications services that use radio frequencies 
but which are not mobile services, and the providers of such services are not mobile radio 
providers. For example, domestic landline long distance service is provided using licensed 
has never asserted that SMR services include only public safety providers like police and fire 
departments and medical rescue teams. Rather, as articulated herein and in earlier briefing, there 
are multiple types of SMR services, discussed at length in the FCC's 1974 and 1975 orders and 
the affirmance of those orders by the U.S. Court of Appeals in NARUC I. As noted by the 
NARUC I court regarding SMR, "[t]he significant factor taken under the present order is the 
assimilation, with the above operations, of profit-motivated systems by an entrepreneur solely for 
the use of third party clients." 525 F.2d at 639. 
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microwave radio frequencies. 8 The FCC licenses and regulates several types of fixed 
communications systems that use radio frequencies. Part 21 of the FCC' s rules, for example, 
regulates domestic public fixed radio services, and Part 101 of the FCC's rules regulates fixed 
microwave services. In addition, commercial satellite services, such as those used to transmit 
video programming to cable operators' headends and ultimately to consumers' residences, use 
radio frequencies.9 Such satellite-based radio services are not mobile services as that term is 
defined in the Communications Act. 10 Thus, the term "mobile radio providers" does not broadly 
refer to communications systems using radio frequencies. It refers only to providers of "mobile 
service," as that term is defined at 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(33). 
Cross-Appellants' claim that the term "specialized" generically means all types of mobile 
radio providers "specifically identified by the FCC ... that connect the public to 911 services" is 
also incorrect. Even if the Legislature intended "specialized mobile radio providers" to be a 
generic term, for that term to encompass TracFone, there must be some basis for concluding that 
8 One of the earlier long distance competitors was a company called MCI Telecommunications, 
Inc., formerly known as Microwave Communications, Inc. See, e.g., A1CI Telecommunications, 
Inc. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 1040 (1978). MCI, like most 
long distance carriers, used microwave frequencies to transmit calls. Microwave technology 
remains in use today to route terrestrial long distance telecommunications. 
9 Licensing and regulation of satellite communications systems is governed by Part 25 of the 
FCC's rules 47 C.F.R. Part 25. 
10 Section 3 of the Communications Act contains a statutory definition of "mobile service." See 
47 U.S.C. § 153(33). In relevant part, mobile service is defined as "radio communication service 
carried on between mobile stations or receivers and land stations, and by mobile stations 
communicating among themselves .... " Of relevance to this discussion, not all radio-based 
services are mobile services within that definition since many radio-based services do not 
involve communication with mobile stations. 
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TracFone's resold wireless service is "specialized."11 However, the implication that there is 
anything specialized about TracFone's resold mobile service is contradicted by Cross-Appellants 
themselves, who describe TracFone as providing "the exact same services to its customers as 
other wireless carriers." (Joint Reply, p. 1.) If TracFone's services are the "exact same" as other 
providers' services, they cannot be "specialized" under any reasonable interpretation. 
Nevertheless, as explained below, the Idaho Legislature used the phrase "specialized mobile 
radio providers" in the same technical manner as the FCC had previously done. 12 
Contrary to the Cross-Appellants' unsupported conjecture regarding legislative intent, a 
more plausible explanation for why the Legislature chose to use the phrase "certain specialized 
mobile radio providers" is consistent with how the FCC determined the regulatory requirements 
applicable to SMRS. When the FCC determined that E91 l access requirements applied to 
cellular and broadband personal communications services, it also applied that obligation to 
"certain specialized mobile radio (SMR) providers" (the identical language incorporated by the 
11 Contrary to their assertion that specialized mobile radio should be afforded some kind of 
unexplained generic meaning, Cross-Appellants make the irrelevant statement that SMRS stands 
for "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems," not "Specialized Mobile Radio Services." (Joint Reply, 
p. 3 n. 6). Since the statutory language codified at Idaho Code § 31-4802(15) is "specialized 
mobile radio providers," this distinction hardly seems significant. However, the Court's (and 
Cross-Appellants') attention is directed to Part 90 of the FCC's rules, specifically, 47 C.F.R. Part 
90, Subpart U which is captioned "Competitive Bidding Procedures for 900 MHz Specialized 
Mobile Radio Service") (emphasis added). See also 9 FCC Red 1411, 1 88 (specifically 
discussing "Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) service."). 
12 Cross-Appellants' reliance on the fact that the Legislature chose not to capitalize the first 
letters in the phrase "certain specialized mobile radio providers" is misplaced. Whether or not 
capital letters were used in the statute does not impact the meaning. Indeed, in § 31-4802( 15) -
the very same statute in which "specialized mobile radio providers" is not capitalized, the 
Legislature did not capitalize "federal communications commission." 
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Legislature in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15)). See Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, 11 
FCC Red 18676, 18716, ~ 81 (1996) (concluding "that certain specialized mobile radio (SMR) 
providers should be subject to the E911 requirements," but that other types of SMR service 
"would not be governed by these E91 l requirements"); see also Interconnection and Resale 
Obligations Pertaining to Commercial A1obile Radio Services, 11 FCC Red 9462, 9464, ~ 2 
(1996) (applying roaming obligations to "cellular, broadband PCS, and certain specialized 
mobile radio (hereinafter 'covered SMR') carriers." (Emphasis added.)). Those "covered SMR" 
carriers included two classes of SMR licensees: 1) SMR licensees that held geographic area 
licenses and 2) incumbent wide area SMR licensees. See id. Notably, TracFone has never held 
any SMR license from the FCC, let alone any other FCC license mentioned in Idaho Code § 31-
4802(15). Neither has TracFone ever provided service by reselling any licensed SMR provider's 
service. 
In 2003, when the Legislature added the definition of "wireless carriers" to Idaho's E91 l 
statute, those FCC orders referencing "certain specialized mobile radio providers" were 
available. It is therefore entirely reasonable to conclude that the Legislature purposefully utilized 
the identical language as the FCC. It is significantly more likely that the Legislature incorporated 
the FCC's language when it drafted the definition of "wireless carrier" than that it intended some 
generic interpretation of that definition. It is highly improbable that the Legislature's use of the 
identical FCC language was pure coincidence. Under any reading of "certain specialized mobile 
providers," it is not a term that applies to TracFone. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this Sur-Reply, as well as in TracFone's prior briefs in this case, 
TracFone is not a "specialized mobile radio provider" and thus, not a wireless carrier under 
Idaho Code § 31-4802(15). 
·~ 
Dated this {2- day of March, 2015. GREENE~E SH0 MAKER OBERRECHT P.A. 
BY{~ b-
Richard H. Greener/Thomas J. Lloyd III 
Mitchell F. Brecher, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 
Dean J. Miller, MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
Attorneys for TracFone Wireless, Inc. 
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Michael J. Kane (for Idaho Association of Counties, Inc.) 
1087 W. River Street, Suite 100, P.O. Box 2865, Boise, ID 83701-2865 
Greg H. Bower/Sherry A. Morgan/James K. Dickinson (for Ada County) 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, Civil Division, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 3191, Boise, ID 83702 
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